Bayesian Game of Locks, Bombs and Testing by Sonin, Isaac M.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
6.
01
16
3v
1 
 [m
ath
.PR
]  
3 J
un
 20
19
Bayesian Game of Locks, Bombs and Testing
Isaac M. Sonin
University of NC at Charlotte
June 5, 2019
1 General Bayesian Game of Locks, Bombs and Testing
In this note, we describe General Bayesian Game of Locks, Bombs and Testing, briefly
LBT game, and the main points of the two incoming papers, [6] and [10], where some
of important special cases were solved. The inspiration for this model was the paper by
K. Sonin, J. Wilson, A. Wright: Rebel Capacity, Intelligence Gathering, and Combat
Tactics, (manuscript, [9]).
In a classical Blotto game, two players distribute limited resources between different
sites (battlefields) with the goal to win more sites, winning a site if you have more
resources on this site than your opponent. There is substantial literature on this topic,
with classic paper [8] and more recent publications, such as [15], where a complete
solution of the continuous version was given, as well as [3], where some interesting
extensions are discussed. In a comprehensive and detailed survey [4] dedicated to Search
Games, the Blotto game is classified as an attack-defense game. There are even more
papers dedicated to these games and, as in all of Operations Research all classifications
have many overlapping parts. As an example of an important paper of an attack-
defense game we mention [14]. Our model shares some similarities with the model in
this paper and the other papers about the Blotto game, but also features some important
distinctions.
In our model, as in most attack-defense games, the two players are not symmetrical.
We call one of them Defender (DF) and the other, Attacker (AT). There are n “sites”
(battlefields, boxes, cells, targets, time slots, etc.) with a vector of values (costs) c =
(ci, i = 1, ..., n). AT is trying to destroy these sites by placing “bombs” that can result
in explosions and destruction, and DF is trying to protect these sites by distributing
“locks” among them. One or more bombs can be placed into the same site. A lock is
a protection device which, placed in a site, prevents its destruction with any number of
bombs in it. Thus, locks and bombs are just the names of discrete units of resources of
protection and destruction. The number of locks k, k < n, can be fixed (paper [10]) or
it can be a random variable, obtained, e.g., if a lock appears in site i with probability λi
independently of other sites. The latter case is the subject of paper [6]. Here we discuss
only the case of k locks. AT has m,m = 1, 2, ..., bombs to allocate among n boxes. A
box is destroyed if at least one explosion occurs, and the explosions of different bombs
in the same site or in different sites are independent. We denote p the probability of
explosion.
The important feature of our model is that AT can and will test every site, trying
to find sites without locks. This testing is not perfect: a test of site i may have a
positive result, Si = 1, even if there is no lock at the site, Ti = 0, and negative, Si = 0,
even if there is a lock, Ti = 1. The probabilities of correct identification of both types,
in a statistical language the sensitivity and specificity, P (Si = 1|Ti = 1) = ai and
P (Si = 0|Ti = 0) = bi, are known to both players. The result of testing is a vector of
signals s = (s1, ..., sn), where each si = 0, 1, known to AT.
When the number of locks k, k < n, is fixed, then the strategy of the defender (DF)
is a probability distribution b(γ) on a set of all possible positions of locks {γ}, where
γ = (i1, i2, ..., ik) with 1 ≤ i1 < ... < ik ≤ n. In our Bayesian setting we assume that this
prior distribution b(γ) is known to AT, although of course the actual positions of the
locks are not. After the locks are allocated, AT receives signal s and, having m bombs,
distributes them among n sites deterministically or using some randomization, trying to
maximize the expected sum of values of all destroyed sites. WLOG, we can assume that
this distribution is deterministic and an optimal strategy of AT pi(m|b(γ)), with respect
to a strategy of DF b(γ), is a collection of her optimal responses u(s|m, b(γ)) ≡ u(s) =
(u1(s), ..., un(s)) to each signal s, where ui(s) is the number of bombs placed into site
i, i = 1, ..., n. Using prior distribution b(γ), the probabilities of signals p(s) ≡ p(s|b(γ)),
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the aposterior distribution of the positions of locks b(γ|s), the optimal strategy pi(m|b(γ))
and the corresponding total expected damage (loss), L(b(γ), can be calculated. The goal
of DF is to select a prior distribution of locks b∗(γ) to minimize this loss. Then the pair
(b∗(γ), pi∗), where pi∗ is an optimal response of AT to strategy b∗(γ), forms a classical
Nash equilibrium (NE) point. The corresponding value of the game is v∗ = L(b∗(γ), pi∗)).
Though b∗(γ) are not unique, they all have common properties that result in a unique
(up to some randomization) AT strategy pi∗, and thus a specific value of v∗. We denote
G ≡ G(n, k,m|a, b, c) this general Locks, Bombs and Testing (LBT) game (model),
where n is the number of sites, k is the number of locks, and n-dimensional vectors a =
(ai), b = (bi) and c = (ci), i = 1, 2, ..., n, represent the sensitivities and the specificities
of testing, and the values of all sites.
Note that sites, locks, bombs and testing in this model are rather abstract terms
and may have very different interpretation beyond our initial exposition of the DF and
AT defence-attack game. For example, the American presidential elections with the
distribution of efforts [resources] between ground battle states, with polls serving as
testing tools, fit this model. In biology and medicine, sites may represent parts of the
body (organs) and bombs units of treatment (chemo, radiation) delivered to metastatic
points and subjected to limitation for a total dose (amount). In Search theory, locks
are hidden objects and bombs are resources spent on detection of the objects. In re-
pair/maintenance models one may consider locks as hidden defective blocks and bombs
as some maintenance/repair units. The number of bombs in an i-th site (block) defines
the probability of repair of this site. Thus, the described game is very flexible and allows
generalizations in many directions: continuous resources, diverse locks and bombs, fake
locks, etc. For example, we can assume that locks can not protect sites from destruction
but can distort signals, and then such model will have common features with modern
Bayesian persuasion models.
There are many possible modifications of the LBT game. We mention only some of
them. We assumed that the parameters ai, bi, i = 1, ..., n are known to DF. Without
this assumption the solution should be quite different. We assumed that the prior
distribution of locks is known to AT. This assumption can be somewhat relaxed but the
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discussion of this subject leads us to the deeper levels of Game Theory.
Finally, we would like to mention that the dynamic version of the GLBT model will
have common features with the well known model in Applied Probability - the Multi
Armed Bandit problems. This model was studied in many papers and a few books - D.
Berry and B. Fristed (1985), E. Presman and I. Sonin (1987, 1990), J. Gittins (1989),
J. Gittins, K. Glazebrook and R. Weber (2011), and the current internet version by T.
Lattimore and C. Szepesvari (2019).
The full solution of the LBT game is a difficult tusk. In the next section, we describe
the full solution of the this game for the so called symmetrical case, in Section 3 we
present some partial results for the general case, and in Section 4 we present the full
solution for the case G(2, 1, 1.
2 Symmetrical LBT model
2.1 Setup
The general G game and the straightforward approach to solving it, described above,
have two basic drawbacks. First, the set of possible positions for locks, i.e., the set of
subsets of an n element set, has order 2n, and so does the set of potential signals. As a
result, the calculations of posterior distributions b(γ|s) and their marginal distributions
αi(s) = P (Ti = 0|s) which play a crucial role in the description of optimal strategies,
become cumbersome for large n. The second problem is that the knowledge of detailed
information about the values of ci, ai, and bi in many cases is unrealistic. As a result,
the main focus in papers [6] and [10] was on the analysis of a simpler symmetrical LBT
(S-LBT) model, where all sites have identical values ci = 1, and all ai = a, bi = b.
Note that both general and symmetrical models have one special and important
feature. Its analysis and the solutions consist of two parts. In the first part, we consider
a statistical problem: in general model, we need to analyze the aposterior distribution
of locks (ADL) b(γ|s), and in symmetrical model, it is sufficient to analyze only the two
critical ratios defined in this section. In the second part, we have to solve an optimization
problem of bombs allocation using signal s = (s1, ..., sn), the aposterior distribution of
locks, and the explosion function p(u), i.e., the probability of at least one explosion of u
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bombs.
In both general and symmetrical models, there are also two possible assumptions
about the number of locks k: problem A(n, k), where the number of locks k is fixed,
and problem B(n, λ), where each of n sites has a lock with probability λ independently
of other sites. In S-LBT model, DF, having no information about AT, uses the uniform
distribution of locks, and we have a one-sided problem to find an optimal strategy for
AT. In problem A(n, k), this uniform prior distribution in statistical physics is called
Fermi-Dirac statistics and any combination of k protected boxes has the same probability
1/
(
n
k
)
. It is easy to show that the probability of protection for a particular box is t =
k
n
.
In problem B(n, λ), the number of locks has a binomial distribution with parameters
n, λ.
In both S-LBT models, in the first, statistical part of the solution, given signal s =
(s1, ..., sn), instead of using the aposterior distribution of locks, it is sufficient to analyze
only two critical ratios: ratio r for problem B(n, λ), and r(x) for problem A(n, k):
r =
P (Ti = 0|Si = 0)
P (Ti = 0|Si = 1)
≡
p−
p+
, r(x) =
P (Ti = 0|Si = 0, N = x)
P (Ti = 0|Si = 1, N = x)
≡
p−(x)
p+(x)
. (1)
As a result, the optimal strategy in both problems will have a much simpler structure
than in the general case, symmetrical with respect to all sites with negative (minus)
signals, and correspondingly for sites with positive (plus) signals. In this statistical part,
the explosion function p(u) and the strategy of bombs allocation do not participate at
all.
Though the solutions of both problems have certain similarities, some of their features
are very distinct. For example, an interesting and even counterintuitive property is
that in problem A(n, k), the function r(x) and therefore the optimal strategy and the
value function, depend on a and b only through the value q =
a
1− a
b
1− b
, a combined
characteristic of the quality of testing. In problem B(n, λ), this property is not true with
respect to the value r. The other important distinction between these two problems is
that in the former problem the minuses and pluses in different boxes are not independent,
but in the latter problem they are.
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In both problems, DF and AT know all relevant parameters and prior distribution
b(γ), but only AT knows the signal. The reader is advised to consider the outcomes
as a result of a two-stage random experiment. In problem B(n, λ), at the first stage, a
lock appears in every site independently of other sites with probability λ. In problem
A(n, k), k locks are distributed at random between n sites, where k is a fixed number.
After that, at the second stage, in both problems, all n sites are tested. The results
of the tests are independent from site to site and depend only on whether a lock is in
the site or not. Formally, we consider random variables Ti, Si, Ci, i = 1, 2, ..., n, taking
two values, 0 and 1; Ti = 1, (0) means that the i-th site has a lock, (no lock); Si = 1
or +, (0 or −), means that the test of the i-th site is positive, (negative), Ci = 1,
(0) means that the i-th site is destroyed, (not destroyed). The absence of subindex i
means that we discuss an arbitrary site, e.g., P (T = 0|S = 0), etc. The outcomes of
the two-stage random experiment described above, i.e., the elements of the probability
space, are pairs (γ, s), where γk ≡ γ = (i1, i2, ..., ik) with 1 ≤ i1 < ... < ik ≤ n, is a
(vector) position of k locks and s = (s1, ..., sn) is a (vector) signal. The probability of
each outcome is P (γ, s) = b(γ)P (s|γ), where b(γ) is the prior distribution of locks and
P (s|γ) = P (S1 = s1, ..., Sn = sn|γ).
2.2 Optimal Strategies and Values in a Symmetrical LBT Model
To solve LBT models means to find an optimal strategy and the corresponding value
function, i.e., the value of the functional under the optimal strategy. A strategy pi ≡
pi(·|m, s) = (u1, u2, . . . , un|m, s),
∑n
j=1 u(j) = m, is an allocation of m bombs in n sites,
given signal s, defined for all m and s. We will skip sometimes to indicate dependence
on m.
The symmetry in the S-LBT model implies two useful formulas
P (s1, ..., sn) = P (N = x)/
(
n
x
)
, P (Ti = 0|s1, ..., sn) = P (Ti = 0|si, N = x). (2)
The first equality is almost obvious, since the symmetry of signals and bombs allocation
implies that P (s|N = x) = c(x), i.e., all signals with the same number of minuses x have
the same probability. Then, since the number of such signals is
(
n
x
)
and
∑
s P (s|N =
x) = P (N = x), we obtain that P (s) is given by the first formula in (2). The second
6
formula in (2) can be obtained from the first one used for the cases of n and n − 1
sites. Let us denote B−(s) and B+(s) the sets of minuses and pluses, given signal s.
Then, using the second equality in formula (2), and the definitions of p−(x), p+(x), r(x)
given in formula (1), we obtain that, given signal s with N(s) = x, and a strategy
pi = (u1, ..., un|s) for m bombs, the value of a strategy pi is
wpi(s) ≡ wpi(s,m) =
n∑
i=1
P (Ti = 0|s)p(ui) =
n∑
i=1
P (Ti = 0|si, x)p(ui) =
= p+(x)[r(x)
∑
i∈B−(s)
p(ui) +
∑
i∈B+(s)
p(ui)]. (3)
Let U− ≡ U−(pi|s) = {uj, j ∈ B
−(s)} and U+ ≡ U+(pi|s) = {uj ∈ B
+(s)} be two
possible sets of the values of uj in minus and plus sites. Formula (3) immediately implies
that in the S-LBT model all strategies obtained by permutations of sets (U−, U+) among
the corresponding sites have the same value, denoted as wpi(x) ≡ wpi(x,m). In other
words, a strategy in the S-LBT model can be understood as an allocation of bombs in
minus and plus sites without taking into account the particular numbers of sites.
We also denote v(x,m) ≡ v(x) = suppi w
pi(x,m), the value function over all such
strategies, givenm and x, and v(m), the value function over all strategies and all possible
values of x, i.e., v(m) =
∑
x P (N = x)v(x,m).
Formula (3) gives a hint that the proportion of the number of bombs placed into a
minus site to the number of bombs placed into a plus site is defined by ratio r(x) =
p−(x)/p+(x), defined in formula (1). Under a “normal” situation, when a and b are such
that tests provide “truthful” information, r > 1 and r(x) > 1 for all x, and therefore,
if there is only one bomb, it should be placed into a minus site. We show later that
“normal” means that a + b > 1. When the number of bombs m exceeds x, optimal
strategies can be expressed through r, r(x), and other parameters. In a sense, the
values N = x, r, r(x) play the role of sufficient statistics in the optimization problem.
Given N = x, 0 ≤ x ≤ n, the allocation of bombs depends on the number m of the
bombs available. The optimal strategy has the following structure. Initially, all bombs
are allocated one by one into each of the x minus sites until the level d(x) ≥ 1 is reached
in each of them or the bombs are exhausted. Afterwards, the bombs are added one by
one to plus sites to reach level one in each of them. Afterwards, the bombs are added
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one by one to minus sites to reach level d(x)+ 1 in each of them, then back to plus sites
to reach level two, etc. Stop this “fill and switch” process when run out of bombs. We
called such strategy d(x) “uniformly as possible” d(x)-(UAP) strategy, and this process
implies that either all minus sites have the same level, or all plus sites have the same
level, or both, and if all plus sites are empty, then the level in minus sites l− ≤ d(x),
and if some plus sites have bombs, then the difference between the levels equals either
d(x) or d(x) − 1. Let us denote m−, m+ the numbers of bombs in the minus and plus
sites. In an example with n = 5, x = 3, m = 10 and d(x) = 2, d(x)-UAP implies that
m− = 8, m+ = 2, two minus sites have three bombs each, one minus site has two bombs,
and two plus sites have one bomb each. If x = 0 or n, then all sites are filled sequentially
one by one and we call this allocation just UAP.
Formally, given m and x, 0 < x < n, d(x)-strategy defines a unique allocation of
bombs, given by tuple (l−, e−, l+, e+), where l−, (l+) is the number of “complete layers”
of bombs in the minus (plus) sites, and e−, (e+) is the number of extra bombs in the
“incomplete layers” in the minus (plus) sites. All these terms depend on m, x and d(x),
but we do not indicate this explicitly. Using shorthand notation l− = i, e− = e, l+ =
j, e+ = e′, we have m = m−+m+, m− = i ∗ x+ e, m+ = j ∗ (n− x) + e′, 0 ≤ e < x, 0 ≤
e′ < n − x and e ∗ e′ = 0. Thus, if m+ = 0, then m = m− ≤ d(x); if e′ > 0, then e = 0
and i−j = d(x); if e′ = 0, j > 0, then either i−j = d(x)−1, e ≥ 0 or i−j = d(x), e = 0.
Theorem 1. Let, given signal s, the total number of minuses N = x, 0 ≤ x ≤ n.
Then
a) if x = 0 or n, then the optimal strategy is to distribute all bombs between the sites
UAP and the value function v(m|0) = v(m|n) for m = n ∗ i+ e, i = 0, 1, ..., 0 ≤ e < n,
is given by formula
v(m|0) = v(m|n) =
n− k
n
[ep(i+ 1) + (n− e)p(i)]; (4)
b) if 0 < x < n, then the optimal strategy is to distribute all bombs between the minus
and the plus sites d(x)-UAP, where d(x) is defined by formula
d(x) = min(i ≥ 1 : r(x)qi < 1), (5)
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q = 1− p, and r(x) is defined by formula (1).
The value function v(x,m) for m = m− +m+ = i ∗ x + e + j ∗ (n − x) + e′, where
the tuple (i, e, j, e′) is (uniquely) defined by value x and a d(x)-UAP strategy, is given
by formula
v(x,m) = p+(x)[r(x)(ep(i+ 1) + (x− e)p(i)) + e′p(j + 1) + (n− x− e′)p(j)]. (6)
c) The value function v(m), m = 1, 2, ..., is given by formula
v(m) =
n∑
x=0
P (N = x)v(x,m). (7)
Remark 1. By definition of d(x), we have r(x)qd(x)−1 ≥ 1. If r(x)qd(x)−1 > 1, then
d(x)-UAP strategy is the unique optimal strategy. If there is the equality, then there are
other optimal strategies with the allocation of bombs obtained as follows. When all minus
sites are filled with d(x)− 1 full layers, the next bomb, if available, can be placed either
in a minus site or in a plus site. The incremental utility will be the same. And so on
with other extra bombs. As a result, the difference between the full layers in the minus,
and the plus sites can be either d(x) or d(x)− 1.
3 Partial Results for the General LBT Game
Before formulating the most general results, we consider some relatively simple situa-
tions. If testing is perfect, i.e., when ai = bi = 1, i = 1, ..., n, the optimal strategyfor
AF is clear: having k locks, she has to defend the k most valuable sites, placing into
them all k locks. With only one available bomb, m = 1, AT will place it into the next
valuable site, and if m > 1, she should solve the problem of discrete optimization, each
time placing the next available bomb into the site with the maximal marginal utility.
The other extreme situation is when testing is non-informative, i.e., when ai = bi =
1/2, i = 1, ..., n. Then the aposterior distribution b(γ|s) coincides with the prior distri-
bution b(γ) for all signals s. Let us say n = 2, k = 1, m = 1, c1 = c, c2 = 1, p = 1. At
first glance, it seems that if c is much larger than 1, DF should place a unique lock into
the most valuable site, and then her loss is 1. But simple calculations show that the
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optimal distribution of locks is ( c
c+1
, 1
c+1
) and v = c
c+1
< 1. AT can place her unique
bomb into any site, or place it at random.
Similarly, for the game G(n = 3, k = 1, m = 1) with vector of values c = (4, 3, 2), it is
easy to obtain that the optimal distribution of a unique lock is given by b(γ) = ( 7
13
, 5
13
, 1
13
)
and v∗ =
24
13
≈ 1.85. But if the vector of values is c = (4, 3, 1), then v∗ =
12
7
≈ 1.71 and
b(γ) = (4
7
, 3
7
, 0). Thus, under the optimal strategy of DF, site 3 is not protected at all.
Given prior distribution b(γ), let us introduce marginal probabilities βi = P (Ti = 1)
and their complimentary probabilities αi = P (Ti = 0). It is easy to show that
∑n
i=1 βi =
k and that
∑n
i=1 αi = n − k, i.e., equal 2 in our examples. Then in the first example
above, we have vector α = ( 6
13
, 8
13
, 12
13
) and thus ci∗αi = v∗ =
24
13
, i = 1, 2, 3. In the second
example, we have α = (3
7
, 4
7
, 1) and thus ci ∗ αi = v∗ =
12
7
, i = 1, 2 and v∗ > c3 = 1. In
both examples, the optimal strategy of DF is unique, but for larger values of n this is
not the case, though all optimal b∗(γ) have the same probabilities αi = P (Ti = 0). A
similar situation holds in the general case. We present here the theorem for the game
G(n, k,m = 1). We present the full version of this theorem for any m and its proof in
the extended paper.
Theorem 2. (Non-Informative Case). For m = 1, c1 ≥ c2 ≥ ... ≥ cn,
a) the class of optimal strategies b∗(γ) has the following structure: there is a k∗ =
k∗(c), k < k∗ ≤ n and a constant v∗ = v(c), such that: ciαi = v∗ for 1 ≤ i ≤ k∗, and
v∗ > ci, αi = 1 for k∗ < i ≤ n;
b) the optimal strategy for AT is to place a bomb at random between the sites with
numbers 1, 2, ..., k∗;
c) the value of the game is v∗ = (k∗−k)/Ck∗ , where k∗ = max{j ≥ k : cj > (j−k)/Cj}
and Cj =
∑j
i=1 1/ci, j = 1, 2, ..., n.
In other words, if k∗ < n, then the sites with numbers greater than k∗ should not
be protected at all, and the distribution of k locks in the first k∗ sites should make all
sites equally desirable for attack. For a Bayesian zero-sum game, this equality is a well-
known fact called the Principle of Indifference, (see e.g. [7] or [1].) Citing the latter text,
“Player 1 searches for a strategy that makes Player 2 indifferent as to which of the (good)
pure strategies to use”. The similar statement for Player 2 in our case has a different
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character. In layman terms: if the strength of a chain is defined by the strength of the
weakest link, and the resources to make links strong are limited, then make all links
of equal strength. This is a special case of a more general “Chain-Link Optimization
Principle” that can be applied to many other optimizations problems, ([11]).
Note also that for any vector of values c, the number k < k∗, the optimal strategy
b∗(γ) is always randomized and value v∗ > ck∗+1. As a result, AT will allocate her m
bombs among the first k∗ sites if m ≤ k∗.
An interesting situation appears when there is a mixture of full informative and non
informative sites, i.e., when ai = bi = 1 for some sites and ai = bi = 1 = 1/2 for all
others. Then a theorem similar to Theorem 1 can be proved with an explicit description
of optimal the strategies for both players.
Of course, the main interest in the Bayesian LBT game problem is the case of imperfect
but informative testing. This means that 1/2 < ai, bi < 1, i = 1, ..., n. To obtain the
description of NE points, we have to solve three problems.
The first problem is, given a strategy of DF b(γ), to describe the optimal strategy
(response) of AT pi(m|b(γ)), i.e., to describe the optimal allocation of bombs u(s|m)
given signal s and m available bombs. The full answer to this problem is given by a
recursive procedure S described in [10]. The expected value of damage (loss) for the
pair of strategies (b(γ), pi(m|b(γ)) can also be obtained.
The second, more difficult, problem is to find the optimal strategy or strategies
b∗(γ) of DF, minimizing this loss. The heuristic meaning of the corresponding Theorem
3 is similar to the meaning of Theorem 1: these strategies have to make the potential
expected losses in the sites, that are worth protecting, equal when AT applies her optimal
response to b∗(γ).
Given a strategy of DF b(γ), let us denote Li(s|m) the expected loss in site i when
AT applies her optimal strategy given signal s, p(s) the probability of signal s and
Li(m) =
∑
s p(s)Li(s|m) is the corresponding expected loss.
Theorem 3. (Informative Case). Given m = 1, 2, ..., the class of optimal strate-
gies b∗(γ|m) can be obtained using the Principle of Indifference, that takes the following
specific form: the values of Li(m) = v∗ must be equal for all i = 1, 2, ..., k∗(m), where
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k∗(m), k < k∗(m) ≤ n, is the number of sites worth protecting, and v∗ is the value of
the game.
The difficulty in applying Theorem 3 lies in the fact that in the informative case the
optimal response depends on signal s, and the calculation of Li(m) is nontrivial. In the
next section, we provide an example of an application of Theorem 3 to find the optimal
strategy.
The third problem to be solved is to obtain the full description of all NE points,
i.e., to describe all b∗(γ) delivering the equality of Li(m) in Theorem 3.
Remark 1. The description of b∗(γ) is based on the following interesting property of
the G game: to obtain the optimal response of AT given any b(γ) and signal s, i.e., to
use procedure R, AT needs to know only the marginal probabilities αi(s) for all s, but
DF, trying to obtain b∗(γ), needs to know v(m) and the total expected loss, so she needs
to know p(s), which are based on the whole distribution b(γ). There is a simple example
that shows that two distinct b(γ) can have the same probabilities αi(s). Thus, one of
the side problems is to obtain the description of all b(γ) having the same probabilities
αi(s).
Remark 2. The statements and interpretation of Theorems 1 and 2 can be expressed
also using the concepts of information and entropy. Loosely speaking, the optimal DF
strategy is to create the situation for AT with the maximal possible entropy.
4 The Full Solution of the Game G(n = 2, k = 1, m = 1, a, b)
As an example of how Theorem 3 works, we outline the full solution of game G(n =
2, k = 1, m = 1) with general vector of values c = (c, 1), c ≥ 1 and symmetric sensitiv-
ities/specificities a1 = a2 = a, b1 = b2 = b, 1/2 < a, b < 1. WLOG the probability of
explosion p can be assumed to equal 1. In this game, there are two possible positions
of locks: γ1 = (0, 1) and γ2 = (1, 0), with prior distribution b(γ1) = x, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, and
four signals s = (s1, s2) ≡ ν: ν1 = (−,+) ≡ (0, 1), ν2 = (+,−), ν3 = (−,−), ν4 = (+,+).
The conditional probabilities of these signals b(s|γ1) ≡ b(νi|γ1), i = 1, 2, 3, 4 are ba =
e1, (1 − b)(1 − a) = e2, b(1 − a) = e3, (1 − b)a = e4, and the conditional probabilities
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b(νi|γ2) are e2, e1, e3, e4. Under our assumptions about a, b, we have e2 < e3, e4 < e1. To
find the best response of AT for each value x and each signal s ≡ νi, we have to compare
the potential damage d1(s|x) to site 1 if a bomb is placed there, equal to c∗P (T1 = 0|s),
with the similar potential damage to site 2, d2(s|x), equal to 1 ∗ P (T2 = 0|s). The real
damage d(s|x) with optimal placement of a unique bomb is given by the maximum of
these two functions for each s and x. We denote P (Ti = 0|s) = αi(s).
We have α1(s) = b(γ1|s) = b(γ1)b(s|γ1)/p(s) and α2(s) = b(γ2|s) = b(γ2)b(s|γ2)/p(s).
Since b(γ1) = x, b(γ2) = 1 − x, for signal ν1 we have α1(ν1) = xe1/p(ν1) and α2(ν1) =
(1 − x)e2/p(ν1). Thus, the decision as to where to place the bomb is determined by
comparing d1(ν1|x) = cxe1/p(ν1) with d2(ν1|x) = (1 − x)e2/p(ν1). Let us denote ρ1 the
value of x where di(ν1|x) are equal. Solving the equality cxe1 = (1 − x)e2, we obtain
that ρ1 = 1/(ce1/e2 +1). This means that the real damage d(ν1|x) = (1− x)e2/p(ν1) on
the interval (0, ρ1), and d(ν1|x) = cxe1/p(ν1) on the interval (ρ1, 1).
Similarly, for signal ν2, we have to compare function cxe2 with function (1 − x)e1.
The second function is larger than the first one on the interval (0, ρ2), where ρ2 =
1/(ce2/e1 + 1). For both signals ν3, ν4 we have to compare function cx with function
1 − x. The second function is larger than the first one on the interval (0, ρ3), where
ρ3 = 1/(c+ 1). Since e1/e2 > 1, we have ρ1 < ρ3 < ρ2 < 1.
As a result, the interval (0, 1) is partitioned into four disjoint subintervals ∆1 =
(0, ρ1),∆2 = (ρ1, ρ3),∆3 = (ρ3, ρ2),∆4 = (ρ2, 1). On subinterval ∆1, where with high
probability 1 − x the lock is in site 1, for all signals the bomb is placed into site 2;
on ∆4, where x is closer to 1, the situation is reversed, and for all signals the bomb is
placed into site 1; on ∆2 for signal ν1 the bomb moves to site 1; and for the three other
signals it remains in site 2; on ∆3 for signal ν2, the bomb remains in site 2; and for
the three other signals it moves to site 1. As a result, the function of the real damage
d(x) =
∑
s p(s|x)d(s|x) is (1−x) on interval ∆1, is cx on interval ∆4, and on the intervals
∆2,∆3 has the following form:
d(x) = e1[
e1 + e3 + e4
e1
+ x(c−
e1 + e3 + e4
e1
)] on interval ∆2,
= e1[1 + x(c
e1 + e3 + e4
e1
− 1)] on interval ∆3. (8)
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Let c∗ =
e1 + e3 + e4
e1
≡
a+ b
ab
− 1 > 1. Formula (8) implies that function d(x) is
decreasing on interval ∆1, increasing on intervals ∆3,∆4, and if 1 ≤ c < c∗, then d(x) is
decreasing on interval ∆2, and hence the minimum of function d(x) is reached at point
x∗ = ρ3 = 1/(c + 1) and d(x∗) = d(ρ3). If c > c∗, then d(x) is increasing on interval
∆2, and hence the minimum of function d(x) is reached at point x∗ = ρ1 = e2/(ce1+ e2)
and d(x∗) = d(ρ1). If c = c∗, then the minimum of function d(x) is reached on the
whole interval ∆2 and d(x∗) = d(ρ1) = d(ρ3). Thus, we obtained the best strategy of
DF, b∗(γ1) ≡ x∗ = x∗(c, e1, e2, e3, e4) and the value of the game v∗ =
∑
s p(s|x∗)d(s|x∗).
They both can be expressed in explicit form, as a function of parameters c, e1, e2, e3, e4
and k = e1/e2 ≡ ab/(1− a)(1− b), as follows:
x∗ = ρ3 =
1
1 + c
, v∗ = d(ρ3) =
c(1 + e1 − e2)
1 + c
≡
c(a+ b)
1 + c
if c ≤ c∗,
= ρ1 =
1
1 + ck
, v∗ = d(ρ1) =
c
e2/e1 + c
=
c
1/k + c
if c ≥ c∗. (9)
For c = c∗ we obtain v∗ = d(ρ1) = d(ρ3) = a+ b− ab.
The best strategy of AT depends on signal s, and is defined by functions di(s|x∗).
Note that when the testing is perfect, ai = bi = 1, we have e1 = 1, e2 = e3 = e4 = 0
and obtain that x∗ = ρ1 = 0, v∗ = 1. In other words, the only lock is placed into more
valuable site 1, and the loss is equal to 1. If the testing is non-informative, ai = bi =
1 = 1/2, we have e1 = e2 = e3 = e4 = 1/4 and obtain that x∗ =
1
1+c
and v∗ =
c
1+c
.
For the values a = 7/12, b = 9/12, we obtain ei = (63, 15, 45, 21)/144, k =
21
5
=
4.2, c∗ = 129/63 ≈ 2.048. Then e.g. for c = 2 we have x∗ =
1
3
, v∗ =
8
9
≈ .889. For for
c = 3 we have x∗ =
1
1+3∗21/5
= 5
68
≈ .074, v∗ =
63
68
≈ .926.
It is interesting to note that in this example for 1 ≤ c ≤ c∗ the optimal strategy of DF
is the same as in the case of noninformative case, i.e. α = ( 1
1+c
, c
1+c
) but this equality
is not true for c > c∗. This tells that the Theorem 3 in this example is working, i.e. for
optimal strategy b∗(γ) ≡ x∗ the equality d1,∗ = d1,∗, the Indifference Principle holds, but
the equality ciαi = const does not.
This relatively simple example shows also that the exact solution of a general G game
can be a challenging problem.
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